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PROTECTING THE SACRED SITES OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN U.S. COURTS:
RECONCILING NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION
AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
KEVIN J. WORTHEN*
The key to understanding current U. S. caselaw concerning the pro-
tection of Native American sacred sites is arguably found in the dissenting
opinion of an eighteen-year old case involving not religious freedom, not
sacred sites, and not cultural heritage - but the right of Indian tribes to im-
pose severance taxes on non-tribal members who extract oil and gas from
tribal lands. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,' Justice Stevens refused
to join the majority's conclusion that the inherent sovereignty of the Jicar-
illa Apache Tribe included the power to impose such a tax. In his view, a
tribe's authority to regulate the activities of non-tribal members "derives
solely from the tribes' power to exclude nonmembers entirely from terri-
tory that has been reserved for the tribe."2 Justice Stevens thus equated the
tribe's power as sovereign with its right as property owner, focusing on
what the Court has called "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property" - "the right to ex-
clude."
3
Justice Stevens' contention that a tribe's inherent authority to regulate
nonmembers derives solely from its right to exclude others from reserva-
tion lands, was expressly rejected by six of the nine members of the Court
at the time.4  The majority chose, instead, to engage in the more complex
and difficult balancing required to determine what inherent sovereignty
means in the unique Indian law context. However, over the last twenty
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, J. Rebuen Clark Law School, Brigham Young Uni-
versity. The author expresses appreciation to John Smith and Thad Levar for their tireless re-
search assistance in preparing this article, which is based on a presentation given at the Fifth St.
Thomas University Tribal Sovereignty Symposium in February 2000.
1. Merion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
2. Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (citing Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
4. Id at 141 ("[v]e are not persuaded by the dissent's attempt to limit an Indian tribe's
authority to tax non-Indians by asserting that its only source is the tribe's power to exclude such
persons from tribal lands").
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years, Justice Steven's position has, sub silentio, gained ascendancy until it
now appears to be the current law in most respects. In its most recent de-
cision addressing tribal sovereignty over nonmembers, a unanimous Court
indicated that once a tribe loses its "landowners' right to occupy and ex-
clude" nonmembers, it generally lacks any inherent authority to regulate
the conduct of those nonmembers.5 The Court cited with approval the ob-
servation of seven members of the Court in a 1993 decision that a "[t]ribe's
loss of the right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation ... implies
the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others."' 6 It
now appears that, to a large extent, the Court believes "[r]egulatory author-
ity goes hand in hand with the power to exclude."7
During the past two decades the Supreme Court has thus reduced a
somewhat nuanced theory of jurisdiction and inherent sovereignty, requir-
ing careful analysis and a sensitive balancing of interests, into a much more
simplified test focusing largely on a single aspect of traditional property
law - a landowner's right to exclude.
What has all this to do with sacred sites? A review of the case law
involving the right of Native Americans to use and protect their sacred sites
reveals that the same kind of simplification has occurred, with the courts
focusing on the same aspect of property law - the right to exclude. For
example, in its seminal decision, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Assn 8 the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the federal govern-
ment violated the free exercise rights of members of three tribes by allow-
ing timber harvesting in, and road construction through, a parcel of
National Forest land traditionally used by tribal members for religious pur-
poses. While acknowledging that the tribal members' "beliefs are sincere
and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse ef-
fects on the practice of their religion," 9 the Court concluded that
"[w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area ... those
rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
5. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997). In Strafe, the Court held that the
Tribe did not have jurisdiction over the conduct of a nonnember involved in an auto accident on
a state highway crossing the reservation on a right-of-way granted to the state. The Court indi-
cated that the land was to be treated like non-Indian fee land, id., and applied the general rule
that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct
of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two exceptions." Id. at 446.
The Court subsequently interpreted the two exceptions very narrowly. Id. at 457-59.
6. Id. at 456 (quoting S. Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993)). In Bourland, the
Court ruled that tribal lands taken by the federal government for a federal dam and reservoir proj-
ect were also to be treated like fee lands owned by non-Indians.
7. S. Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 691 n. I1 (1993).
8. Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
9. Id. at 447.
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land."' The federal government, not the Tribes, had the property right to
exclude others, and as owner, it had no duty to grant preferential rights to
anyone. Indeed, the Court observed ruling for the tribal members would
require an unacceptable shift in the respective property interests of the
tribal members and the federal government. "[ ]hen one notes that such
beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property ... the diminution of the Government's
property rights ... would in this case be far from trivial."" The Court re-
fused to sanction what it characterized as the tribal members' attempt to
impose a "religious servitude" on the Government's property.' 2  It ex-
pressly declined to engage in the difficult, but important task of balancing
the competing interests involved 3 and instead opted to focus on property
law concepts.
A similar theme has been sounded in lower federal court rulings un-
der the Free Exercise Clause, both before and after Lyng. Prior to Lyng, for
example, a federal district court in Tennessee rejected the free exercise
claim of members of the traditional Cherokee religion who sought to enjoin
completion of the Tellico Dam and the resultant flooding of various sacred
sites. The court focused solely on the relative property rights of the parties
and found determinative the government's right as land owner to chose
whom it would admit onto its land.
14
The federal government uses the land it owns for a wide variety of
purposes, many of which require limiting or denying public access to
the property ... The free exercise clause is not a license in itself to en-
ter property, government-owned or otherwise, to which religious prac-
titioners have no other legal right of access. Since plaintiffs have no
other legal property rights in the land in question ... afree exercise
claim is not stated here.
s
10. Id. at 453.
11. Id. The Court noted that the District Court's ruling in favor of the Native Americans
"permanently forbade commercial timber harvesting, or the construction of a two-lane road, any-
where within an area covering a full 27 sections (i.e. more than 17,000 acres) of public land." Id.
12. Id. at 452.
13. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457.
14. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), offd
620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980).
15. Id. at 612 (emphasis added). While the Sixth Circuit subsequently indicated that "the
plaintiffs' lack of any property interest" in the land in question "should not be conclusive," 620
F.2d at 1164. It nevertheless affirmed the lower court decision and the Supreme Court's decision
in Lyng appears to follow the district court's reasoning more closely than it does the reasoning of
the Sixth Circuit.
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Similarly, the federal district court in Badoni v. Higginson,16 focused
on property rights in rejecting the efforts of members of the Navajo Tribe
to prevent the flooding of Rainbow Bridge National Monument, which the
tribal members claimed would result in the "destruction and desecration of
many Navajo gods and sacred areas."17 The first basis of the court's ruling
was that the "plaintiffs do not allege nor do they have any property inter-
est" in the land at issue.18 "Because plaintiffs ha[d] no interest in the land,"
the court agreed with defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs claim "does
not come within a country mile of any cognizable legal theory upon which
relief can be granted," concluding that "the lack of a property interest is de-
terminative."19 As Professor Allison Dussias has thoroughly described,
other pre- and post-Lyng cases similarly rely on property law concepts to a
very considerable extent.2°
Instead of engaging in the critical and difficult balancing task that a
full free exercise analysis might require, federal courts dealing with Native
American sacred sites issues in the past twenty years, have paralleled fed-
eral courts dealing with tribal jurisdiction issues by collapsing the analysis
into a single-factor test which focuses largely on who has the critical prop-
erty right to exclude. The fact that the tribes have lost the right to exclude
others from these sacred areas under traditional common-law property
analysis is determinative. As is the case with a tribe's regulatory jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers, a tribe's ability to obtain legal protection for in-
digenous sacred sites appears to go "hand in hand with the power to ex-
clude."2' If the sacred site is on tribal lands the tribe can protect it and use
it as it wishes. If the site is on lands owned by others, including public
lands long used by the tribe, the tribe has no legally protectable interest.
16. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), affd 638 F.2d 172, 181 (10th
Cir. 1980).
17. Id. at 643.
18. Id. at 644.
19. Id. Like the Sixth Circuit in Sequoyah, the Tenth Circuit in Badoni rejected the trial
court's conclusion that the "plaintiffs' lack of property right was determinative." Badonl, 638
F.2d at 176. However, also like the Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tho lack of
property interest was "a factor" and affirmed the lower court decision. Id. Moreover, as was the
case in Sequoyah, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Lyng seems more in keeping with
the district court's line of reasoning than that of the court of appeals.
20. Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 823-833 (1997) (discussing, in addition to Badoni and Sequoyah, Crow v, Gullet, 541
F.Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aft'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Wilson v. Block,
708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United Slates v. Means, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988); Manybeads
v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989); Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395
(D. Ariz. 1990); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff'dsub
nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991)(per curiam)).
21. See supra note 7.
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Why has this happened, one might ask? Several answers are possible.
Perhaps the most obvious is that this ascendancy of property law concepts
in Native American sacred site cases is the result of prejudice, conscious or
unconscious, against Native Americans or at least Native American val-
ues.22 After all, "[t]he principle point of dispute between white and Indian
historically has been land. '2" Given the intimate connection between many
Native American cultures and their lands,24 one would be hard pressed to
design a more effective scheme for decimating these cultures than one
which used common-law concepts of property - with their emphasis on in-
dividual ownership and the concomitant right to exclude - as the legal
paradigm within which disputes between the cultures would be resolved.
That the sacred site caselaw's preoccupation with property rights is
fueled by anti-Native American sentiment is supported by the fact that the
same focus on property rights has manifested itself in the Supreme Court's
recent tribal civil jurisdiction cases. 25 It appears that the last twenty years
have witnessed the "propertization" of federal Indian caselaw in general.
26
When one adds to this fact the reality that in the last three centuries, Native
Americans have been dispossessed of so much of the land they once
"owned."27 This leaves them at a considerable comparative disadvantage
22. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 21, at 851 ("in light of the government's past efforts to
suppress Native American religious practices, the Court's willingness to accept the denial of Na-
tive American religious rights as an acceptable sacrifice to democracy suggests continuing hostil-
ity toward Native American religious traditions").
23. WILCO1M E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND / WHITE MAN'S LAW 143 (2d ed.
1995).
24. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Lyng, "Native American faith is inextricably
bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from the
Native American perception that land itself is a sacred, living being." Lyng v. N.W. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. See text accompanying notes 5-7, supra.
26. Id.
27. For example, as a result of the allotment policy, under which tribal lands were divided
into individual allotments for tribal members, with excess lands being made available to non-
Indians, "total Indian landholdings [fell] from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in
1934." CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMIERICAN INDIANS, TIE, AND THE LAw 20 (1987). Even
prior to the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887, tribes had been deprived of much of
their land by the removal policy of the early 1800's, see Felix Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 78-92 (1982), and by confinement to reservations much smaller than their tradi-
tional land base, see ROBERT N. CLINTON, NELL JESSUP NEWTON & MONROE E. PRICE,
AMiERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 146-47 (3d ed. 1991). The impact of these
efforts was especially acute for sacred sites because "[r]eservations often were set aside and tribal
lands confiscated without regard for the location of sacred sites, leaving many sites on federal or
state lands, and a few in private non-Indian hands." Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Illusion of Re-
ligious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363, 396 (1986). See also Anastasia
P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native Ameri-
can Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1309 (1996) (noting that during the 1800's "Native
Americans lost possession of many sacred sites when forced onto reservations").
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in a scheme in which ownership is the key factor. Thus, one can make a
powerful argument that the root cause of the current state of the law is anti-
Native American sentiment, or at least antipathy toward Native American
values and culture. If that is the true source of the problem, until such sen-
timents are eliminated, it will matter little what kinds of arguments Native
Americans make in sacred site cases - they will lose.
Yet, this position seems too simplistic and too pessimistic for a couple
of reasons. First, emphasis on property rights, particularly the right to ex-
clude others, has increased even in the non-Indian law context in the past
twenty years. Prior to 1980, the Supreme Court had on only one occasion
held that government regulation constituted an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation.28 In the last twenty years, by
contrast, the Court has found government regulations unconstitutional un-
der the takings clause three times, 29 and has indicated its belief that takings
may well have occurred in other cases where a final ruling could not be
made because of the procedural posture of the case. 30 In each of the three
direct rulings the Court invalidated government actions that interfered with
the landowner's right to exclude, 31 a right which the Court characterized as
28. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
30. In First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987), the Court assumed, because of the procedural posture of the case, that the prop-
erty owner had been deprived of all economically viable use of the land for a period of time and
then held that the landowner was constitutionally entitled to compensation for that temporary tak-
ing if, on remand, the assumption was proven correct. In Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court held that government restrictions which deprive a landowner of
all economically viable use of the land are per se unconstitutional takings unless the restrictions
are consistent with pre-existing (though perhaps not express) principles of state property or nui-
sance law. Id. at 1029-1030. It then remanded the case for consideration whether the exception
applied, after expressing doubt that it did. Id. at 1031.
31. Loretto invalidated a statute that required landlords to permit cable companies to install
cable on their property in exchange for payment of a fee established by a state commission. See
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-24. Critical to the Court's analysis was its conclusion that under the
statute the landowner "has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the
space." Id. at 435. Nollan invalidated the California Coastal Commission's requirement that the
landowners grant access to the public to pass over the beach portion of their property as a condi-
tion to issuing a building permit. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. The Court reasoned that "[h]ad
California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to
the public ... we have no doubt there would have been a taking" because "the right to exclude
[others is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of [property] rights." Id. at 831 (internal
quotation omitted). In Dolan, the Court struck down a city's requirement that a landowner dedi-
cate portions of her property for improvement of the storm drainage system and a bicy-
cle/pedestrian pathway as a condition to granting her a permit to redevelop her property. See Do-
lan, 512 U.S. at 379. In distinguishing this from an ordinance which would have simply
prohibited the property owner from developing the land, the Court noted "the difference to [the
landowner], of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude others... [which] is 'one of the most
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"one of the most essential sticks" 32 and "most treasured strands" 33 in a
landowner's bundle of property rights. Thus, it may not be so much a de-
cline in the weight given Native American interests, as a marked increase
in the weight given property interests - especially the right to exclude -
that explains the Court's recent emphasis on property rights in sacred site
cases.
34
Second, it is not just Native Americans who have seen their sacred
sites desecrated without legal recourse. The U. S. government has on other
occasions, both in the past and in the present, used property law concepts as
a club against religion, even when the religion is not Native American. For
example, in its effort to prevent members of The Church of Jesus-Christ of
Latter-day Saints (the L.D.S. Church or Mormons) from practicing polyg-
amy, as then required by their religious beliefs,35 the federal government
enacted a series of statutes in the late 1800's. The last dis-incorporated the
L.D.S. Church and transferred its property to the government 3 6 Pursuant
to that statute, the government sought and obtained appointment of a re-
ceiver to take over the property of the L.D.S. Church, including the Temple
essential sticks' in the bundle of [property] rights." Id. at 393.
32. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384.
33. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
34. Indeed, the dissenting justices in Loretto criticized the majority's emphasis on certain
elements of a property right, including the right to exclude others, in terms that apply equally well
to the Court's simplification of the tribal jurisdiction and free exercise claims of Native Amrai-
cans:
The Court erects a strained and untenable distinction between 'temporary physical
invasions,' whose constitutionality concededly 'is subject to a balancing process,' and
'permanent physical occupations,' which are 'taking[s] without regard to other factors
that a court might ordinarily examine.'... In my view, the Court's approach reduces
the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble...'
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. L.D.S. doctrine teaches that plural marriage was initiated as a result of a revelation from
God to the prophet Joseph Smith. See Preface to THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, § 132, 266 (1981)(hereinafter DOCTRINE
AND COVENANTS); Plural Marriage, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMoNISM, 1091-92 (1992). The
L.D.S. Church formally ended the practice of polygamy in 1890 when it accepted as "authorita-
tive and binding' a declaration from its then President, Wilford Woodruff, that:
[ilnasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding plural marriages,
which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court of last resort, I hereby
declare my intention to submit to those laws and to use any influence with members
of the Church over which I preside to do likewise.
See OfficialDeclaration, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS, supra, at pp. 291-92. See also LEONARD
J. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS
1830-1900, 376-79 (1958).
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 397, '§§ 13, 17, 24,1887 (repealed 1978).
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Block in Salt Lake City37 on which the Salt Lake Temple was being con-
structed.38 That land had been dedicated in a formal religious ceremony
more than thirty years previously 39 as the site of the most sacred of build-
ings in L.D.S. theology - the only sites where, according to L.D.S. beliefs,
ordinances essential to exaltation can take place.40 While the Utah Supreme
Court ultimately eliminated this particular property from the receivership,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to dispossess the
Church of its property, stating simply "we have no doubt of the power of
Congress to do as it did.'41
In more modem times, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a city's
condemnation of religious property claimed to have special significance
42
for the Pillar of Fire Church, an evangelical religious group.43 The court
concluded that the church had not proven that the site was significant
enough to its religion to stand in the way of an urban renewal project, []
and noting, tellingly, that "[e]ven if the Pillar of Fire had proven that the
church building was Sui generis [sic], the scales tip convincingly in favor
of the interest of the Denver Urban Renewal Authority in this case.,"44
37. ARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 368. L.D.S. church authorities voluntarily surrendered
some of the property, including the Temple Block, to the receiver "with the reservation that an
appeal would be made" and an agreement that the Temple Block would be leased back to the
church for $1 a month. Id. Work on the temple, which had been progressing for more than thirty
years, stopped at the time. See id.
38. See id. Anticipating the passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act, church officials in 1886
conveyed the existing temples in St. George, Logan, and Manti, Utah, to "temple associations"
organized for the purpose of placing legal ownership of these three sacred buildings in the hands
of local ecclesiastical leaders. Id. at 362.
39. JAMES E. TALMADGE, THE HOUSE OF THE LORD 115 (1971). The Salt Lake Temple site
was dedicated and ground was broken for its foundation on February 14, 1853. The site was cho-
sen only four days after the first Mormon pioneers arrived in the Salt Lake valley. Id. at 113.
The building was not completed until forty years later. Id. at 127.
40. Id. at 75-91 (describing the ordinances performed in L.D.S. temples). L.D.S. theology
teaches that in order for a person to be exalted in the highest degree of the celestial kingdom (the
highest degree of heaven), a person must be married in the temple. DOCTRINE AND COVENANTs,
supra note 35, § 131:1-4, at 266. James Talmadge, who was a member of the L.D.S. Church's
governing body of the Twelve Apostles, summarized the role of temples in L.D.S. doctrine very
succinctly: "Temples are a necessity." TALMADGE, supra note 39, at 74.
41. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 64 (1890). As a result of the decision, the government seized property valued, in 1890 dollars,
at more than $1 million. ARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 371.
42. The site was "revered for its historical and symbolic meaning in the birth" of the Church
because it was constructed shortly after the founding of the Church to house meetings originally
held in tents. Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250, 1252 (1973) (herein-
after Pillar of Fire I)
43. The Colorado Supreme Court described the church as "an evangelistic offshoot of
Methodism." Pillar of Fire I, 509 P.2d at 1251. The church was originally known as the Pente-
costal Union. Id. at 1251.
44. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo. 1976) (hereinafter
Pillar of Fire II).
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Still more recently, the Seventh Circuit held that a private organiza-
tion could not maintain a statute of Christ on land located in the middle of a
public park, even though ownership of the land (and hence the right to ex-
clude) had been conveyed to the private organization. It concluded that
"the continued perception of government endorsement" and the granting of
"preferential access" to the private organization constituted a violation of
the Establishment Clause.45
In these three instances, non-Native American religions were unable
to protect sites sacred to them and use them as they wished, even when they
owned the land and possessed the critical right to exclude. Since no Native
Americans were involved in these cases, they suggest that at least some of
the bias at work in Native American sacred site cases may be an anti-
religion bias. Perhaps reliance on the property law scheme, rather than on
some more nuanced balancing analysis, is the result of uneasiness with, or
even hostility toward, religious values in modem society.4 6
The reluctance to rule in favor of the religious use of property may
also stem from the belief, accurate or not, that it is required by the Estab-
lishment Clause. Concern that a ruling in favor of the tribes would result in
a violation of the Establishment Clause is often expressly manifested in the
sacred sites cases. 47 Courts may also be hesitant to make the kinds of diffi-
cult distinctions that would be required if they were to engage in the sensi-
tive task of determining the sincerity and centrality of the religious beliefs
of others and then balancing those beliefs against other competing inter-
ests.
48
45. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d. 487,497 (7th Cir.
2000).
46. Several scholars have noted an anti-religious theme in modem religion clause jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel
School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L. J. 433, 484 (1995) (noting that the rationale of recent
Establishment Clause cases "demands hostility to religion, and a blatant preference for the secu-
lar"); Karen T. White, The Court-Created Conflict of the First Amendment: Marginalizing Relig-
ion and Undermining the Lmv, 6 J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 210 (1994) C'[rather than fostering
neutrality, the Court's rulings have produced hostility to religious beliefs and devalued the posi-
tive effects of religion on society"). See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Lfe and Has-
tility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992) (advancing the proposition that American politics
are hostile to religion in public life).
47. See, eg., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785, 791, 794 (D.S.D. 1982), ofl'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983); Inupiat Cmty. of the
Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D.Alaska 1982), affd. 746 F.2d 570(9th
Cir. 1984); Wilsonv. Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. 3073,3075 (1981).
48. The Court expressed such concerns in Lyng.
This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the relig-
ious objections here or in [another free exercise case] and accordingly cannot weigh
the adverse effects on the appellees [in that case] and compare them with the adverse
247
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Regardless of the reason, or the appropriateness, of the hesitation to
protect sacred sites on overtly religious-based grounds, such as the Free
Exercise Clause, the phenomenon is real enough that some consideration
should be given to seeking protection not on free exercise or other grounds
dependant on the value of religion to society, but on grounds more directly
compatible with common law property principles which appear to be in as-
cendency in federal courts in both the Indian and non-Indian law context.
There is some evidence that, at least in some contexts, this will work.
In one of the relatively few instances in which Native Americans have been
successful in using litigation to protect their religious practices in a land
use context, United States ex rel. Zuni Tribe of New Mexico v. Platt,49 a
federal district court severed the Zuni Tribe's free exercise claim from its
prescriptive easement claim and ruled in the Tribe's favor on the latter.
The Court held that by Arizona state law the Zuni Indians had a prescrip-
tive easement to cross over a private landowners' property during a two-day
period every four years as part of a religious pilgrimage to a sacred site in
northeast Arizona.50 With religion out of the equation5' the court even
stretched the law somewhat to rule in the Native Americans' favor,5 2 some-
thing courts have been more than hesitant to do when ruling on free exer-
cise grounds in cases involving land use.
53
effects on the Indian respondents. Without the ability to make such comparisons, we
cannot say that the one form of incidental interference with an individual's spiritual
activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other.
Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-450 (1988)
(citations omitted).
Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free ex-
ercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the lo-
cation ... cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a relig-
ious objector's spiritual development.
Id at 451.
49. United States ex rel. Zuni Tribe of New Mexico v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D. Ariz.
1990).
50. See id. at 323-24.
51. The court made clear that it did "not base its ruling on any religious or Ist Amendment
rights to the land in question." Id. at 324 (citing Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988)).
52. Id. at 322. The court found that the Tribe was in "continuous possession" even though it
merely passed over the land on two days every four years. The ruling was not extraordinary in
light of prior precedent involving a claim established by two-to-three week possession every year,
id. (citing Kay v. Briggs, 475 P.2d 1 (1970)), but it was still an extension of the law, even if a
logical one. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, courts have not made any extensions, logi-
cal or otherwise.
53. A federal government lawyer who appeared on behalf of the Tribe in the case has noted
that one of the lessons learned from his experience is that "a successful claim for a prescriptive
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Such a shift wiU not always be easy because the sacred sites claims of
Native Americans do not always fit neatly into the categories recognized by
traditional U.S. property law. However, there are signs that innovative
thinking concerning the intersection of longstanding Native American land
use practices and traditional common law property concepts can lead to
surprisingly favorable results for Native Americans. In the last decade, in-
digenous people in both Hawaii and Australia have gained the right to use
lands for which they did not have fee title, relying on their customary use
of the lands for traditional purposes, and demonstrating that common law
principles may, in some situations, be flexible enough to accommodate Na-
tive American beliefs and practices.
In a series of decisions beginning in 1982,- 4 and culminating in its
1995 decision in Public Access Shoreline Hmaii v. Hawai 'i County Plan-
ning Comm'n,55 the Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized and expanded
the right of Native Hawaiians to access, for customary and traditional uses,
less than fully developed lands56 owned by others. The court noted in its
seminal decision that the right "remains intact, notwithstanding arguable
abandonment of a particular site.' 57 In these cases, the court has concluded
that the traditional common law right to exclude is not absolute in some in-
stances and that customary uses of the lands, including use for religious
practices, 58 are not necessarily inconsistent with the exercise of that right
easement narrowly drawn to conform to the actual Indian religious needs may be possible without
regard for First Amendment problems ..." and that while almost, "... if not all of the evidence
would be of religious orientation, the specific activity, that is the actual physical use of the land
... would not be presented to the court as a legally cognizable religious right but as mere indicia
of the fulfillment of the requirements for a prescriptive easement." Hank Meshorcr, The Sacred
Trail to the Zuni Heaven: A Study in the Lmv of Prescriptive Easements, in READINGS IN
AMERwCAN INDIAN LAW. RECALLING THE RHYTH OF SURVIVAL, 318, 323 (Jo Ca.illo ed.,
1998).
54. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982); Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,
837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992); Public Access Shoreline Hawaii, Inc. v. Hawai'i County Planning
Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995); State v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485 (Haw. 1998).
55. Public Access Shoreline Hawaii, Inc. v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d
1246 (Haw. 1995).
56. See Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 494-95 (in Hanapi, the Hawaii Supreme Court clarified that "if
property is deemed 'fully developed' i.e. lands zoned and used for residential purposes with exist-
ing dwellings, improvements, and infrastructure, it is always 'inconsistent' to permit the practice
of traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights on such property").
57. Public Access Shoreline, 903 P.2d at 1271.
58. While claims are often couched as claims to use the land for traditional and customary
gathering rights, Pele involved "the assertion of customarily and traditionally exercised subsis-
tence, cultural, and religious practices" Id at 1260 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court relied
in part on article XI, section 7 of the Hawaiin Constitution, which, provides that the State will
"protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural, and religious
purposes." Id at 1258 (emphasis added).
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by others. 59
Similarly, the Australian High Court has in the last ten years over-
ruled prior precedent and recognized the concept of aboriginal title, thereby
granting Australia's indigenous peoples a previously unrecognized legal
right to use lands for which they possessed no formal written title. In Mabo
v. Queensland: the Court concluded that the "indigenous inhabitants in oc-
cupation of a territory when sovereignty is acquired by the Crown are ca-
pable of enjoying proprietary interest in lands." Those rights "which they
had theretofore enjoyed under the customs of their community are seen to
be a burden on the radical title which the Crown acquires."6' More re-
cently, in Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland62 the Court held that pastoral
leases, a unique Australian property interest covering up to 40% of the land
in the country,63 do not necessarily include the right to exclude all others
and therefore do not automatically extinguish the native title the Court had
recognized four years earlier in Mabo.
64
Thus both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Australian High Court
have reexamined existing property law concepts, including the right to ex-
clude others, and have found them more flexible with respect to traditional
indigenous uses than most had previously thought possible. Native Ameri-
59. The Court indicated that "[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Ha-
waiian history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally
applicable in Hawai'i," id. at 1268, but consistent with "the non-confrontational aspects of tradi-
tional Hawaiian culture." The Hawaiian Constitution grants the State the authority to reconcile
traditional Hawaiian rights and western property rights by declining protection to traditional uses
that are "unreasonable" i.e. practicing on fully developed lands. Id. Without indicating whether it
agreed with the ruling, the Hawaii Supreme Court cited Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, and noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court had held "unreasonable" an attempt "by religious practitioners to exclude all
other uses, including timber harvesting, from sacred areas of the public lands." Id. at 1268 n. 38.
60. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. There is no single majority opinion for the
Court. Justice Brennan authored a judgment, with which two other justices (Mason and McHugh)
concurred in the reasoning. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 182 (per Mason, CJ and McHugh, J). Justices
Dean and Gaudron authored a joint opinion, and Justice Toohey authored an opinion agreeing
with much of what they said. Six of the seven justices were "in agreement that the common law
of this country recognizes a form of native title," but split 3-3 on the issue of whether extin-
guishment of native title "gives rise to a claim for compensatory damages." Id. On that issue,
Justice Dawson, who was the sole dissenter on the issue of whether a common law native title
existed, joined three others in refusing to agree that extinguishment of aboriginal title required
payment of compensation. Id.
61. 107 A.L.R. at 37 (Brennan, J). Justice Toohey likewise indicated that "[i]f occupation
by an indigenous people is an established fact at the time of annexation, why should more be re-
quired?"
62. "Wik" Peoples v. State of Queensland (1996)141 A.L.R. 129.
63. Garth Nettheim, Wik: On Invasions, Legal Fictions, Myths and Rational Responses, 20
U.N.S.W.L.J. 495,496 (1997).
64. The Court did indicate, however, that the lessees of pastoral leases can continue to en-
gage in any activity authorized by the lease and that, in the event of any conflict between the abo-
riginal title and pastoral lease rights, the lease rights will prevail. Wik, 141 A.L.R. at 190.
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cans seeking to gain legal protection for their use of sacred sites may be
able to achieve similar gains by couching their claims in property law
terms.
For example, tribes which entered into treaties with the U.S. could re-
examine those treaties to determine whether they contain express reserva-
tions of ceremonial and subsistence rights or other rights which might be
interpreted broadly to protect sacred sites outside their reservations.65  If
the tribes determine that the rights are not expressly stated, then they could
claim that such rights still exist because they were not expressly extin-
guished by the treaty.66 Similarly, a tribe which had not entered into a
treaty might consider whether it could claim an unextinguished aboriginal
right to access and use a sacred site.
67
It should be emphasized that such claims would have to be infused
with innovative arguments about the nature of property rights. Efforts to
use arguments based on traditional views of treaty and aboriginal rights to
protect Native American religious practices have not fared much better in
the past than have efforts based on the Free Exercise Clause.68 Moreover,
property law concepts in Hawaii and Australia are different enough from
those in the continental United States that the extent to which these rulings
would be adopted by other U.S. courts is far from clear.69  Nonetheless,
both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Australian High Court relied to a
considerable extent on long-standing common law principles of property
65. Cf. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1998) (broadly inter-
preting the term "fish" in a treaty because of the Tribes' pre-treaty right to take fish without spe-
cies limitation).
66. Cf. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 326-37 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the Yakima
Nation retained jurisdiction to regulate off-reservation fishing by tribal members because the
treaty did not expressly relinquish such rights).
67. Cf. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1477-79 (D. Ariz. 1990), q#('d
943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (recognizing aboriginal tide to sacred lands, but finding
such title extinguished by subsequent federal reservation of the lands for forest purposes and
compensation for the taking of the land). For an explanation of how Native American litigants
might respond to such arguments about extinguishment of aboriginal title, see text accompanying
notes 71-73, infra.
68. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a
claim that mining on national forest service lands considered sacred by the Tribe violated the
Tribe's aboriginal property rights); United States v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (rejecting a claim that a treaty protected taking panthers for religious purposes).
69. According to most standard accounts the type of aboriginal title recognized in Mabo has
been extinguished in most areas in the United States. Thus, the ruling which recognizes that abo-
riginal title may be extinguished by the government may be of little use to many tribes in the con-
tinental U.S. But see text at notes 71-73, infra. The Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the
customary and traditional rights of Native Hawaiians fit into its property system in part because
of the unique way that property law had developed in Hawaii with differences reflected in both
statutory and constitutional provisions. See Public Access Shoreline, 903 P .2d at 1258-70.
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law.70 Both have attempted to reconcile, in a new way, the tension between
the land owner's right to exclude and the right of indigenous peoples to use
the same land in order to perpetuate their culture. If nothing else, these
cases indicate that with innovative thinking previously unpersuasive claims
may now have more force.
Thus, while courts have repeatedly held that reservation of lands for
national forests or parks extinguishes aboriginal title,71 a claimant could ar-
gue that such rulings were based on the erroneous view that aboriginal title
exists only in the form of an exclusive possessory right. Therefore, courts
have overlooked the possibility that while that broad right may have been
extinguished, a lesser right, somewhat like a limited easement, may still ex-
ist. Courts have found congressional compensation of a [] tribe's claim for
destruction of aboriginal title convincing evidence that all aboriginal title
has been extinguished.72 However, a tribe may argue that because the In-
dian Claims Commission generally awarded compensation only for the
economic uses to which the land could be put and not the actual uses Na-
tive Americans made of it,73 tribes may still have some claim to access the
land for non-economic uses. These would include religious uses. Such
claims might have particular appeal to courts enamored with property
rights if they emphasize longstanding prior use, a key fact which exists in
many sacred sites cases74 and is accorded considerable weight under tradi-
70. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the rights it recognized were
"akin to" those established by "the English doctrine of custom whereby practices and privileges
unique to particular districts continued to apply to the residents of those districts even though in
contravention of the common law" Id. at 1261. The Australian High Court relied on several
common law principles including the "general rule ... that ownership could not be acquired by
occupying land that was already occupied by another." Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 31 (Brennan, J.).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonoso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1391-92 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 177 F.Supp. 452, 467-68 (Ct. Cl.
1959); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1478-79 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff'd 943
F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir.1976); Havasupal
Tribe, 752 F. Supp. at 1478-79.
73. See, e.g., Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 389 F.2d 778, 788 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (denying claim to compensation for loss of fishing rights); Id. at 793 (Nichols, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that in compensating Tribes for un-mined gold but denying them compensation for
their fishing rights "the Indians are being denied payment for the most valuable do facto asset of
which they were deprived and instead are being compensated for de jure assets they never could
have reasonably supposed belonged to them"). See also Barsh, supra note 27, at 410 (noting that
compensation awarded only for "economic or 'land-resource use'); MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE
PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO vs. THE UNITED STATES 142 (1997) (noting
that fair market value approach used by the Commission "measured only the economic value of
land," even though "[tihe real value of land to a tribe included its role in maintaining group iden-
tity and continuity, its religious significance, its aesthetic qualities, and a host of other attrib-
utes").
74. In many sacred site cases, Native Americans used the site before the land was set aside
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tional property law rules.75
Efforts to reshape sacred sites claims from religious-rights based free-
exercise claims to customary-rights based property claims create at least
two risks for Native Americans. First, such efforts may dilute the force of
any Free Exercise claims that may exist 76 Second, making such argu-
ments may lessen the significance of the religious practice to adherents
who may not feel the same pull from a ceremony that is merely customary
or traditional rather than religious or spiritual. Given the current state of
sacred sites case law, these risks, while real, seem acceptable.
As to the former, one wonders how much is lost even if Free Exercise
claims are completely compromised by such an effort. The track record for
such claims is not stellar to say the least. Moreover, giving up the Free Ex-
ercise claims would eliminate the potential Establishment Clause concerns
which may be an impediment to the success of any religious-based argu-
ment, as several courts have noted in passing.,"
As to the latter, the risk of diluting the spiritual significance of a prac-
tice by characterizing it as traditional or customary, rather than religious,
may be less for Native Americans than for others. This is largely because
Native Americans are often already forced to re-characterize their claims in
artificial ways in order to make them the type of religious claims that U.S.
courts will understand.78  As others have pointed out, for many Native
American religions there is no division between the religious and the non-
religious.79 Thus, when Native Americans assert Free Exercise or relig-
for any specific use by non-Indians. See, eg., Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177 (land used by Navajo for
at least 100 years); inupiat Community, 548 F. Supp at 185 (land used by Inupian "from time be-
fore human memory"); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (land used for religious purposes "for a very long
time").
75. RICHARD R. POWELL, 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 34.10 (Patrick J. Rohan ed.
1998).
76. The Sixth Circuit rejected the efforts of members of the Cherokee Tribe to prevent the
flooding of certain sites on free exercise grounds because it found that the
[t]he overwhelming concern of the [challengers] appears to be related to the historical
beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural development. It is damage to tribal
and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observances which
appear to be at stake. ... Though cultural history and tradition are vitally important to
any group of people, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1980).
77. See, e.g., Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179; Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 791, 794 (D.S.D.
1982), af'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983); Inupiat Community, 548 F. Supp. at 189; Wilson v.
Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. 3073,3075 (1981).
78. See Dussias, supra note 21, at 806-11, 815-19.
79. As Professor Robert Michaelsen has observed:
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ious-based claims in U.S. courts they are already often required to force
their own concepts into what for them are illogical compartments."0 The
label one puts on these artificial categories would seem to matter less than
that they have to be used at all in order to assert a legal claim. For Native
Americans the damage may be the same whether the practice is portrayed
as traditional and customary on the one hand or religious and sacred on the
other. Hence, while there clearly is some risk of dilution whenever Native
American groups resort to U.S. judicial forums for protection of sacred
sites, there may be no net loss if the claim is characterized as a traditional
and customary property right rather than a religious right. The potential
benefits from such a shift may therefore justify the increased risk in both
respects.
However, even if recharacterizing sacred sites claims as non-
religious, traditional or customary property claims yields the gains
achieved in Hawaii and Australia, and avoids the potential Establishment
[t]he typical western approach is to split reality into separate categories which can be
objectified and labeled "church," "religion," "culture," "art," "economics," "politics,"
etc. But the use of this common approach in dealing with traditional Indian realities
rends the seamless garment of Indian life. "The area of worship cannot be delineated
from social, political, cultural, and other areas of Indian lifestyle, including his gen-
eral outlook upon economic and resource development," said a representative of the
Crow Indian Tribe to a Senate Committee.
Robert S. Michaelsen, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.
LAW AND RELIGION 47, 62-63 (19B) (quoting AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Hear-
ings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the Select Comm. On Indian Affairs, U.S. Sen., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 86 (1978)).
80. See Dussias, supra note 21, at 815-19. "[A]ny division into 'religious' or 'sacred' is in
reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories." DOROTHEA
THEODORATUS, REPORT FOR U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE ON CULTURAL
RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS
NATIONAL FOREST, reprinted in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, supra note 53, at 302
and quoted in Michaelesen, supra note 79, at 63. See also Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Stan-
dards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1291, 1295 (1996) ("For Native Americans, the spiritual life is not separate from the
secular life"); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("for most Native Americans,
'the area of worship cannot be delineated from social, political, cultural, and other areas of Indian
lifestyle").
Referring to the Hopi culture, one scholar observed:
The culture is completely religious and therefore completely consistent. If you wrote
an essay on Hopi farming, it would be an essay on Hopi religion; on Hopi hunting, it
would be an essay on Hopi religion; an essay on Hopi family life would be an essay
on Hopi religion; on Hopi games the same - everything they do and think is about
their religion.
Hugh Nibley, Promised Lands, Address Before the Bill of Rights Symposium
(October 9, 1992), in CLARK MEMORANDUM, 1993, at 5-6.
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Clause problems, that may not be enough to protect what is truly at stake in
many Native American sacred sites cases. In Hawaii,81 Australia, and even
in the Zuni Pueblo case what each court was willing to grant was a right of
shared access to the lands at issue. In many cases, shared access is not
enough. What is required for full use of the sacred sites is, in many in-
stances, exclusive access for at least some of the time.82 Indeed, in almost
all Native American sacred sites cases over the last two decades, the Native
American claimants have sought the right to exclude others from using the
property in ways which desecrate its sacred nature.83
What the Native Americans claim and need in such situations is the
right to exclude others from property which the Native Americans do not
own in the legal sense. If full legal protection is to be provided this shift
must occur because there is, in many instances, a connection between the
protection of sacred sites and the right to exclude others because of the
connection between sacredness and secretness. 84 This is especially true for
81. As the Ninth Circuit indicated in rejecting the claim of a native Hawaiian family to ex-
clusive use of a fish trap within a national historic park, Public Access Shoreline Hmwaii. "did not
involve any claim for exclusive use and possession." Pal 'Ohana v. United States, 76 F.3d 280,
282 (9th Cir. 1996). The court concluded that ancient Hawaiian custom "did not include the right
to remain upon and exclude others from the land." For the claimed purposes, the court held that
the contention that "native Hawaiian rights are exclusive and possessory is, [ unsupported in the
law." Id.
82. As Russel Barsh has noted, "Indians' concerns include not only access to, but the envi-
ronmental integrity of the site and its wildlife, and privacy when they use it." Barsh, supra note
27, at 396. Thus, for many Native American religions,
[t]he ability to exclude intruders ... is fundamental, as is the right to come and go
freely without dependent on the permission of others. Exclusivity is as important to
Indians on a mountaintop as to Christians in a church or Jews in a synagogue. All
value the right to bar the gates against disruption or desecration.
Id. at 409.
83. See, eg., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442 (Native American use of site required "privacy, silence,
and an undisturbed setting"); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816 (10th
Cir. 1999) (Native American religious use of site requires "solemnity and solitude"); Badoni v.
I-Igginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), af'd, 638 F.2d 172, 176-77 (10th Cir. 1980) (Plain-
tiffs claim that allowing tourists to visit the area caused noise, litter, and defacement, desecrating
the sacred nature of the area and denying their right to conduct religious ceremonies); Crow v.
Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 788-89(D.S.D. 1982), afd,706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiffs al-
lege that the conduct of tourists and the construction of access roads and parking lots desecrated
the area and destroyed "the sanctity and power of the religious ceremonies"); Inupiat Community
of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D. Alaska 1982), aftd, 746 F.2d
570 (9th Cir. 1984) (Inupiats claim that all exploratory activities negatively affect their hunting
and gathering life-style).
84. As one scholar has noted, "[t]he sacred and the secret have been linked from earliest
times." Sissela Bok, SEcRETS 6 (1982). Bok explains that both concepts "are defined as being set
apart and seen as needing protection. And the sense of violation that intrusion into certain secrets
arouses is also evoked by intrusions into the sacred." Id.
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many Native Americans, whose "religious beliefs and practices ... depend
so intimately on privacy and the maintenance of land in a natural condi-
tion."
85
Thus, the effort to protect Native American sacred sites in U.S.
courts by the use of non-First Amendment law principles will be fully suc-
cessful only when the right to exclude is expanded beyond its property law
form in a way that it can be invoked by a non-land owner. Once again, the
foundation of such a right may be found in non-religious-based common
law principles. But this time it is tort law, not property law, that provides
the basic ingredients.
Modem common law tort principles have developed in this century to
protect a person's interest in solitude or seclusion, imposing liability on
"[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the soli-
tude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ... if the intru-
sion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 86 Tort law is de-
signed to prevent unreasonable invasions on any "private seclusion that the
plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. '87 Although courts are re-
luctant to impose liability when the plaintiff is in a public place when the
invasive acts occur,88 they have done so in appropriate circumstances not-
ing that there are situations in which a person can reasonably expect to be
left alone even in public places. 89
If used creatively, these tort law principles could provide some degree
of protection in some circumstances to exclusive Native American use of
sacred sites even on public lands. A key question in determining how
much protection might be available is whether interference with Native
American use of sacred sites on public lands would be "highly offensive to
a reasonable person." 90 There may be some skepticism as to how well Na-
85. Barsh, supra note 27, at 409.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1999).
87. Id. at § 652B comment c.
88. See id. ("No liability for observing or photographing plaintiff while he is walking on a
public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the
public eye").
89. See, e.g. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-95 (defendant liable for interference with
seclusion even though some of the acts took place in public places and on public streets). See
also Evans v. Detlefsen, 857 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that tort could occur in a pub-
lic restaurant because "the privacy which is invaded has to do with the type of interest involved
and not the place where the invasion occurs"). The comments to the Restatement Second observe
that "[e]ven in a public place ... there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his under-
wear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy
when there is intrusion upon these matters." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 652B, comment
c. See also id., illustration 7 (noting that taking a photograph of a young women whose skirt is
blown over her head in a public place of amusement constitutes an invasion of privacy).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1999).
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rive American interests might be protected by a reasonable person standard
given the oft-times large cultural gap between Native American views and
those of mainstream American society in whose image the reasonable per-
son standard is usually cast. But some optimism in this regard can be
found in several Tribes' recent efforts to protect their use of Bear Lodge,91
a geologic formation in northern Wyoming considered sacred by those
Tribes.
92
After a series of meetings involving representatives of the Tribes, lo-
cal governments, environmental groups, and rock climbers who regularly
climbed the formation, all parties agreed that "out of respect for American
Indian religious values" there should be some limits on rock climbing.
This restriction was during one month of the year when the site was most
used for sacred ceremonies.93 This agreement indicates acceptance of the
reasonableness of the Native American's request that they have exclusive
use of the site on at least some occasions. Moreover, when the National
Park Service subsequently implemented a voluntary closure policy pursu-
ant to the agreement, 94 85% of those who would have normally used the
site for climbing during the month voluntarily chose not to do so.95 This
experience provides some evidence that a reasonable person might well
find intrusion on Native American use of sacred sites highly offensive.
Again, while it is unlikely that a court would grant relief to Native
Americans under a straight-forward application of the current version of
the intrusion on seclusion tort, innovative use of the doctrine might at least
change a judge's conception of the claim enough to generate success for
Native Americans in sacred site cases. This is true especially if coupled
with a successful property right claim to at least shared access to the site.
91. The site is more commonly referred to as Devils Tower, the name used when the site
was designated as a national monument in 1906. Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear's Lodge
or Devil's Tower: Inter-Cultural Relations, Legal Pluralism, and the Management of Sacred Sites
on Public Lands, 8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201, 203-04 (1999).
92. Several tribes, including some which no longer reside in the area, have oral traditions
concerning the creation and significance of Bear Lodge. Id. at 206-07. The Northern Cheyenne
and the Lakota are the two tribes which today have the "strongest affiliation with the Tower." Id.
93. Id. at 216.
94. A group of climbers' claim that the voluntary ban violated the Establishment Clause was
dismissed for lack of standing by the Tenth Circuit Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt,
175 F.3d 814, 822 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 120 S.CL 1530 (2000). The dis-
trict court had rejected the claim on the merits. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F.
Supp. 1448, 1453-56 (D. Wyo. 1998).
95. Burton & Ruppert, supra, note 91, at 213 n. 65. A 1992 survey of climbers indicated
that 67% would still continue to climb the tower even if"they knew that Native Americans con-
sidered it a sacred site and objected to climbing." Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 818-19. Whether the
later more favorable results indicate a shift in attitude, a different sampling group, or some other
factor is not clear.
ST. THOMASLAWREVIEW
Ultimately, however, long-lasting judicial protection for Native
American sites will be available only when there are more marked changes
in the attitudes of judges and the rest of American society. Current legal
doctrines such as property and privacy concepts may be flexible enough to
accommodate such changes, but they are not, in current form, sufficiently
developed to guarantee success. The kinds of arguments set forth in this
article will provide protection for Native American sacred sites only if
judges and other policy makers are educated about the unique Native
American perspective about such sites and become convinced that there is
value in protecting Native American use of those sites. Therefore, while
Native Americans should use property, tort, and other flexible areas of the
law as vehicles for advancing their efforts to obtain legal protection for sa-
cred sites, efforts should continue to be made to convince all Americans of
the societal benefits generated by allowing religious adherents, including
Native Americans, to practice their beliefs without undue outside interfer-
ence.96 Only then will there be true reconciliation between Native Ameri-
can religion and the right to exclude.
96. Some recognized the societal benefit of allowing Native Americans freedom to engage
in traditional religious practices in the late 19th century, even as these practices were being out-
lawed on many reservations. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 21, at 791 & n. 136 (quoting reports
of Indian agents that the "moral tendency" of a religious dance of the Pottawatomie tribe was
"very good" and that "under its teaching drunkenness and gambling have been reduced 75 per-
cent") (quoting 1884 COMM'R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 102 (report of H.C. Linn, Pottawa-
tomie and Great Nemaha Agency, Sept. 10, 1884); 1885 COMM'R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP.
111 (report of I.W. Patrick, Pottawatomie and Great Nemaha Agency, Aug. 20, 1885)).
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